

Oct 23-87

(2 Brezhnev policy)

1. - If Khrushchev agreed in memo to US...
He still couldn't control Castro
or deter US response to Castro
or US action

Not would SU ministers have been
"acceptable..."

MOD-~~III~~ (IV) (not "int. sec.", ^{Mod I} Conferences; ^{last} Pro, domestic)

2. Pro not intend this: "ministers would go"

(and, first move - accompanying US disclosure
to US public, must be "strong" (w. Stimson:

w. Nixon! R, McN, Ball (Taylor?) no trade, negot

that guaranteed support for strike;
(Pro could yield, trade, only in "crisis")

3. Pres underestimated willingness of Turks (+ Germans?)²
to take risk rather than back down.

"Jky don't underestimate... explain to them."

4. Pres guided to advisors on Oct 27; Pres got us
in to crisis, but advisors kept us in, on Oct 27
(likewise SU: K got in, advisors kept in on Oct 27,
morning and during day.)

5. Why didn't K tell OFK about Cuba, Oct 27 10AM?

Well, " " OFK " K " SAC U-2, in afternoon?!

(Embarrassing admission; ²) not reaching to attempt, or
²) MAY HELP PRESSURE...
legitimizing of your policy, which looks reckless, irresponsible

W/ note "explains"? (Never apologized, never apologized)
Buck: I will run apol. for American

President (U-2, SAC U-2) will help
Prisoner Rente/Ambition Air, whereas
explaining looks weak, fearful, defensive,
undermining ^{proprietor of} Ambition Air + Prisoner Option
without reducing its risks much;

(Now that revenue is supposed: noting to
do but cross one's fingers, hope it doesn't
happen again

in Monzoose apol! ASW; NSA SAC "Conclusion"
that U-2 was shot down (under drill analysis?)

Assumptions (Oct 27) - K controlled SSMs

SAMS

+ AA

RFK thought he was giving K 48 hrs
to ~~move~~ - thought he would,

^{VFR}
we were ready to "blink" - SU nifty

2nd RFK thought: U-2 had been shot down
consequently by K

But K didn't control AA

and even SAM is in question, etc

Oct 23-87

"Never apologize, never explain"

Bush (card): "I will never apologize for America."

(Still running us, Carter?)

Did he apologize?

- He refused, to apologize to America!

Oct 87

- Now, he demands a UN investigation of who started war!

- JFK said he would have, for U-2! in debate

- McG said, he would crawl on his knees with N

CT

7 Nov 87

For 25 years we were lied to
about "what was worth risking we
were, going to war - we were with losses, for"
on Cuba

and on Berlin, in 1961 (starting during
(see JFK in Schles, RFK.) minor gap!)

"Necessary bluffs; and necessary to
keep bluff secret, ^{from us} for months, in some years
last time SU, but K, encourage Trial or
intervention, but, 25 years? see effort on US ^{*} public.

* See effect of bluff on US policy,
on an ability to negot, to avert
future crises, to back down or deal
in future!

(See effect of "drawing the line"
on offensive weapons in Sept 63 (too late):
this to justify not reacting to lesser
provocations, "defensive" weapons: "I have not
dangerous, meaning, potential, like ICBMs" — ^{not}, "We don't
have the right

SUN

7 Nov 97

In 1963, in "getting rid of Diem"
we made the error of believing our
own propaganda (of 9 years -
beyond our s-m memory)

a GUN

- That there existed an SUN apart
from Diem (and, apart from USG;
and, apart from NVN — and NVN suffering,
as in 1954-56, and then, 1956-60 and ^{VN's were} _{went to the}

CT

Row. 7


3.

In late 63, JFK chose next to explain his non-reaction to defensive build-up by:

3) We've been threatening the with
invasion (he was, at least, unwilling to
measure Cuba on this!)

2) We have no right to intervene } quantity
3) SL have right to acquire } of
states

3) 5h have right to organize



CTH

Nov 8

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Meaning of

"close to war"

"real risk of war"

evidence for

"miscalculation"

"loss of control"

- Is this not what happened - CTH?

- in "tiring border" (Killer finding)

- also, this revelation (+ about JFK or Turkey)

waited 25 years - "not everything constant in NY"